Rethinking the Brown Resolution: Toward Effective and Sustainable GOP Reform

Forging the Future: Why the Ohio Republican Party Needs Practical and Legally Sound Disciplinary Measures

Josh Brown is an Ohio Republican State Central Committee member that introduced the toothless tiger resolution of censure that was thought to correct the bad behavior of the Blue 22. That was very unsuccessful and Josh Brown again offers another toothless tiger resolution that provides no discipline for bad actors in the Ohio Republican Party

Hey Team,

Today, I’d like to dive deeper into why the Brown Resolution isn't just a misstep—it’s a potential stumble into a legal and logistical quagmire. Let’s unpack this with a bit of common sense, the kind we use when we fix things that are broken.

What’s on the Table? The Brown Resolution proposes stringent penalties for GOP members who cross party lines during crucial votes, specifically targeting those who deviate during the vote for Republican leaders. On paper, everything looks good and one could perceive it as an attempt to enforce discipline. But here’s the thing—it’s really very similar to the resolution the State Central Committee passed earlier that was a toothless tiger, and in many ways that toothless approach has led us to where we are today.

Legal Overreach and Practical Shortcomings

First off, the legal ground for the resolution is as shaky as a three-legged stool. Imposing a 16-year penalty for not toeing the party line might seem nice but in reality, there will never be a 16 year penalty imposed due to Ohio Revised Code 3599.10. We're talking about a rule that could see the State Central Committee members sued for imposing what amounts to a required pledge on their own members for voting on the floor of the Ohio House.

Section 3599.10 | Corrupt practices - candidate for general assembly shall not be asked to pledge vote.

No person, firm, or corporation shall demand of any candidate for the general assembly any pledge concerning his vote on any legislation, question, or proposition that may come before the general assembly; provided that this shall not be understood to prohibit a reasonable inquiry as to such candidate's views on such question or legislation.

Whoever violates this section is guilty of a corrupt practice and shall be fined not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.

The Brown Resolution assumes it can enforce a 16-year penalty. But here’s the straight talk: each new State Central Committee is its own boss. They can’t be forced to hold up a decision made years ago they weren’t a part of. It’s like trying to enforce a handshake agreement from a decade ago, with people who weren’t even in the room. Imagine telling your kids they have to wear the clothes you picked out for them when they’re 40. Doesn’t make sense, right? Each new Central Committee is its own entity and can't be shackled by the decisions of its predecessors. The Brown Resolution isn’t just impractical; it’s contrary to the principles of democratic renewal and organizational autonomy that guide many bodies, from corporate boards to legislative assemblies.

The proposed 16-year penalty is a perfect example of this overreach. Not only does the party lack enforceability (since no committee can commit its successors to specific actions or penalties), but it also assumes a static political and legal landscape that simply doesn’t exist. The Ohio Republican Central Committee is trying to write checks it can’t possibly cash.

Other reasons on why the Brown Resolution misses the mark:

1. Control Confusion: The statement about deciding who controls the Ohio House legislative campaign fund has its wires crossed. The real deal is, the Ohio Revised Code dictates that the Republican House caucus calls the shots on fund administration, not the party. Ohio Revised Code 3517.10(D)(3)(d) provides “Each legislative campaign fund shall be administered and controlled in a manner designated by the caucus” This top-down meddling by the state doesn't mesh with past U.S. Supreme Court decisions that say, "The State needs to keep its nose out of the party’s internal governance unless it's serves a compelling State interest." And right now, I'm not seeing the necessity.

2. Streamline the Machine: Right now, we're running a three-engine operation (The State Central Committee and the legislative fund in the Ohio House and Senate) that could easily fly with one. If we demand that the Ohio House and Senate put the State Central Committee in charge instead of splitting between the House and Senate, we'd save on overhead like a pro shopper saves on coupons. But, let's admit it, past money management fumbles by the State Central Committee make some folks nervous.

3. Legal Landmines: Section 3599.10 will most likely result in fines on our central committee members if they push officeholders to pledge to vote for the pick of the caucus. It's like walking a tightrope without a net over how we influence legislative decisions.

4. Discipline Disconnect: Our current resolution is as watery as a soup with no salt—no real kick for disciplining members who act as unethically as Benedict Arnold.

5. Penalty Problems: Speaking of effectiveness, this resolution’s like a guard dog that won’t bite. There's nothing in it stopping the managers of the legislative fund from spending money on whoever they please, endorsed or not. Censured, or not.

6. Political Fallout: The Blue 22 saga shows us that not endorsing doesn't necessarily sway elections. So, what's the point if it doesn't change outcomes? Eight of the Blue 22 members with challengers won re-election

7. Event Attendance: The Resolution prohibits the bad actors from attending Republican events. Folks, the party has Not created any must-attend events in such a long time - it means this no real social penalty for those who step out of line.

8. Ignoring the Rules: There's a gap big enough to drive a truck through when it comes to enforcing this resolution. What happens if the chairman decides to look the other way? There is no penalty for the chairman if they do not enforce this resolution and because this does not amend the party’s bylaws - it get’s thrown out as soon as another incoming central committee takes the helm. Additionally, nothing prevents this resolution from being suspended by a simple majority of the committee.

9. Missing Money: Over three million gone, stolen, and misappropriated - and no real plan to get it back or prevent future fiscal fiascos.

10. Empty Threats: Previous censures were more bark than bite, and it shows. Folks aren't taking these verbal tongue lashings to heart.

11. County Compliance: This resolution doesn't ensure that if county parties don’t toe the line in honoring State Party Censures that they will face any disciplinary actions.

12. Future Ties: Trying to bind future committees for 16 years? That’s like trying to enforce a no-ice-cream rule at a summer camp... a decade from now. It just doesn’t stick.

Building a Better Resolution Here’s how we can craft a resolution that's not only enforceable but also fair and effective:

1. Focus on Immediate and Enforceable Actions: Any disciplinary actions should be immediate and within the current committee's tenure. This keeps the accountability clear and immediate. Disaffiliation of candidates that break party rules, engage in actions that breach their expected loyalty, and any breach of expected ethical standard and good faith - sends an immediate message and powerful deterrent.

2. Strengthen Bylaws for Long-term Impact: Instead of imposing long-term bans that aren’t likely to be enforced, we should focus on amending party bylaws to ensure consistent and ethical behavior across the board for all Republican officeholders and candidates. Certainly bylaws can be amended, altered or abolished by future central committees but this would provide more stable and clear guidelines to hold officeholders accountable.

3. Encourage Ethical Campaign Practices: Clearly define what constitutes ethical campaigning within the party. This isn’t just about punishment; it’s about setting a standard that uplifts all members and provides clear guidelines on acceptable practices. Republicans should not engage in the character assassination of fellow Republicans

4. Implement a Review and Renew Process: Include a mechanism for regular review of disciplinary rules and penalties. This allows each new committee to reassess the relevance and effectiveness of existing rules and make adjustments as needed, ensuring that rules evolve with the party and the political climate.

I would recommend that at a minimum Speaker Stephens is disaffiliated from the Republican Party and possibly the 8 members of the Blue 22 that were challenged in their primary and won should be disaffiliated. This could be accomplished by resolution adopted with a simple majority. At the very least you could challenge Stephens to have a primary election for the officers of the party in the Ohio House and Senate – and if he does not comply then disaffiliate him.

I would recommend challenging the section of law 3517.10(D)(3)(d) that is an obviously impermissible and illegal encroachment on the management of the internal affairs of the Ohio Republican Party. This section of code serves no compelling interest for the State, I would also challenge the ability of state law to require the party to have two legislative funds

Conclusion The goal here isn’t just to prevent members from stepping out of line; it’s to create a framework where stepping out of line isn’t the best option anymore. We need to cultivate a party culture that values open discussion, ethical behavior, and collective action over punitive measures.

Let’s put down the sledgehammer and pick up the right tools for the job. It’s time to work smarter, not harder, to build a GOP that's as resilient and principled in its governance as it is in its policies.

Ready to roll up the sleeves and get this right. What are your thoughts?

Best regards,

Jon Morrow

References:

Assertion: Each newly elected central committee in Ohio is not bound by the bylaws (permanent rules of the Ohio Republican State Central Committee) of its predecessor and can amend or adopt entirely new bylaws pursuant to Ohio Revised Code 3517.04, it is essential to review the statutory language, understand the legal definitions of relevant terms, and examine any pertinent case law from Ohio or comparable jurisdictions that may provide precedent or insight.

3517.03, helps to define how a controlling committee relates to a central committee and how that relates to the party: “The controlling committees of each major political party or organization shall be a state central committee consisting of two members, one a man and one a woman, representing either each congressional district in the state or each senatorial district in the state, as the outgoing committee determines; a county central committee consisting of one member from each election precinct in the county, or of one member from each ward in each city and from each township in the county, as the outgoing committee determines; and such district, city, township, or other committees as the rules of the party provide.”

Statutory Interpretation of Ohio Revised Code 3517.04

Ohio Revised Code 3517.04 addresses the organization of State and county central committees and stipulates procedures for their initial meeting post-election. The statute states:

"…..Notice of any meeting held pursuant to this section, giving the place and time, shall be sent to each member-elect by the retiring secretary of the committee by mail and a copy of the notice shall be posted in the office of the secretary of state or board of elections, as the case may be, at least five days prior to any such meeting. The meeting shall be called to order by the retiring chairman or secretary or if there is no such officer….."

This statute mentions the "retiring” committee members implying a distinction between the committee as constituted before the primary election and the committee as newly constituted thereafter.

3517.01(C)(4) "Continuing association" means an association, other than a campaign committee, political party, legislative campaign fund, political contributing entity, or labor organization, that is intended to be a permanent organization that has a primary purpose other than supporting or opposing specific candidates, political parties, or ballot issues, and that functions on a regular basis throughout the year. "Continuing association" includes organizations that are determined to be not organized for profit under subsection 501 and that are described in subsection 501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), or 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code.”

3517.01(A)(15) "Legislative campaign fund" means a fund that is established as an auxiliary of a state political party and associated with one of the houses of the general assembly.”

The present Ohio State Central Committee cannot legally bind a future State Central Committees to its resolutions because it is not a continuing association. While a major “Party” classification is somewhat permanent in nature and provided for in Ohio law – the State Central Committee (the controlling committee of the party) is renewed every 2 or 4 years and Ohio law only provides for an “organizational” meeting for each Central Committee and does not provide for subsequent reorganizations as would be the case for a continuing organization. The State Central Committee is inherently temporary in nature as defined by law. Each State Central Committee can make their own rules and this resolution provides no penalties beyond the Primary in 2026 unless the committee chooses to take it up. For any type of perceived permanence this resolution would have to at a minimum be incorporated into the bylaws because State Central Committee resolutions are discarded upon a new incoming State Central Committee coming into existence (“organizing”) at the organizational meeting.

Stare Decisis and Autonomy in Organizational Law: Generally, each session or term of a structured body (like a committee or board) possesses autonomy to govern its affairs unless specifically bound by higher statutory requirements or overarching organizational charters that dictate otherwise.

●      Analogous Legal Precedent: In corporate governance, new boards are often vested with the power to amend bylaws unless restricted by the corporate charter or statutes (see Delaware General Corporation Law for corporate parallels).

●      Judicial Interpretation: Courts often interpret statutory mandates for organizational meetings as opportunities for new bodies to set their operational and procedural rules, aligning with principles of democratic renewal and functional autonomy.

Autonomy and Renewal: Just as each new Congress or each new Ohio House of Representative is considered a separate legislative body, distinct from its predecessors. This separation allows each new Congress or Ohio General Assembly to reflect the current and immediate priorities and ideologies of its newly elected members. Importantly, while many rules are often carried over for the sake of procedural continuity, there is no requirement that a new Congress or General Assembly must adopt the rules of the previous Congress or previous General Assembly.

The only way for the State Central Committee to become a continuous entity is for it to stagger four-year terms of its members (for example electing half of its membership (women) in a Presidential election year and the other half (men) in a gubernatorial election year.) With the overlap of members, the party would pass the baton (bylaws) legally from Central Committee to Central Committee making it effectively a continuing organization.

3517.10(D)(3)(d) Each state political party shall have only one legislative campaign fund for each house of the general assembly. Each such fund shall be separate from any other funds or accounts of that state party. A legislative campaign fund is authorized to receive contributions and make expenditures for the primary purpose of furthering the election of candidates who are members of that political party to the house of the general assembly with which that legislative campaign fund is associated. Each legislative campaign fund shall be administered and controlled in a manner designated by the caucus. As used in this division, "caucus" has the same meaning as in section 3517.01 of the Revised Code and includes, as an ex officio member, the chairperson of the state political party with which the caucus is associated or that chairperson's designee.